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IS SILENCE GOLDEN?  NOT AFTER HIIBEL v. SIXTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT OF NEVADA 
  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a nation whose citizens cannot move about in public unless they 
are prepared to document their identity and account for their presence upon 
demand.  Imagine a nation where a law abiding citizen who has committed no 
wrong may be detained by police.  Now imagine that this nation is the United 
States of America. 
In a country which prides itself on being a free nation, the right to privacy 
is among the privileges most valued by society.1  This right can generally be 
defined as the right to be left alone and freedom from government intrusion 
into one’s private life.2  Despite the widely recognized importance of this 
fundamental right, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Hiibel v. Sixth 
Judicial District of Nevada,3 which upheld the constitutionality of “stop and 
identify statutes,”4 could jeopardize the liberties afforded by both the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution in a most significant way.  In 
addition to representing the erosion of some of our nation’s most cherished 
protections, the Court’s holding employs contradictory logic to create a rule 
with problematic applications. 
The Hiibel Case 
The man at the center of the controversy is a cowboy named Dudley 
Hiibel.5  One evening, in May of 2000, Mr. Hiibel was standing outside of his 
pickup truck smoking a cigarette on a long stretch of rural road in Humboldt 
 
 1. See Nonnie L. Shivers, Firing “Immoral” Public Employees: If Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights Protects Employee Privacy Rights, Then Why Can’t We?, 
21 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 621, 643 (2004) (citing Elizabeth Wilborn, Revisiting the 
Public/Private Distinction: Employee Monitoring in the Workplace, 32 GA. L. REV. 825, 832-33 
(1998)); Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,” 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 
193-97 (1890). 
 2. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 
U.S. 616, 630 (1986)); Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195). 
 3. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177 (2004).  
 4. Id. at 190-91. 
 5. Id at 181; see also Hiibel, http://www.papersplease.org/hiibel/index2/html (last visited 
Oct. 11, 2005). 
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County, Nevada.6  Around this same time, the Humboldt County sheriff’s 
department received a call reporting a disturbance.7  An anonymous caller 
stated that he had observed a man and a woman in an argument, which 
culminated in an assault against the woman.8  A deputy was promptly 
dispatched to investigate.9 
When the officer arrived at the scene, he found Hiibel standing outside of 
his truck, which had been pulled over to the side of the road.10  The police 
officer noticed a woman inside the truck.11  The officer also noted that there 
were skid-marks behind the truck, which supported the inference that the 
vehicle had come to a sudden stop.12  Additionally, the deputy suspected that 
Hiibel had been drinking which aroused his suspicion that Hiibel could have 
possibly been driving while intoxicated prior to the officer’s arrival on the 
scene.13 
The deputy accosted Hiibel as he stood on the side of the road beside his 
vehicle.14  The deputy asked Hiibel to identify himself, to which Hiibel 
responded with an inquiry as to why such an action was necessary.15  The 
deputy stated that he was conducting an investigation and reiterated his request 
for Hiibel to identify himself.16  Hiibel insisted that he had done nothing wrong 
and repeated that he did not understand why his identification was being 
demanded.17  Over the course of the encounter, the officer requested for Hiibel 
to identify himself eleven times, with Hiibel refusing each time.18  Hiibel 
eventually placed his hands behind his back and challenged the officer to arrest 
him.19 
Finally, the officer decided to place Hiibel under arrest.20  However, Hiibel 
was not arrested for public drunkenness, disturbing the peace, trespassing, 
assault, or even because the officer suspected that he had been driving while 
intoxicated.21  To the contrary, Hiibel was arrested only because he would not 
 
 6. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 180; see also Hiibel, http://www.papersplease.org/hiibel/index2/html 
(last visited Oct. 11, 2005). 
 7. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 180. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 180. 
 13. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 180-81. 
 14. Id. at 181. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 181. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See id. 
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identify himself to a law enforcement officer.22  The arrest was effectuated 
pursuant to Nevada’s version of what is often called a “stop and identify” 
statute.23  Nev. Rev. Stat. § 171.123 states: 
1. Any peace officer may detain any person whom the officer 
encounters under circumstances which reasonably indicate that the 
person has committed, is committing or is about to commit a crime . . . 
3. The officer may detain the person pursuant to this section only to 
ascertain his identity and the suspicious circumstances surrounding his 
presence abroad. Any person so detained shall identify himself, but 
may not be compelled to answer any other inquiry of any peace 
officer.24 
Hiibel was charged and convicted of interfering with an officer who was 
“carrying out his duties under § 171.123.”25  Hiibel maintained the “stop and 
identify” statute in question violated his constitutional liberties, specifically his 
rights guaranteed under both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the 
Constitution.26  The Sixth Judicial District Court considered the case on appeal 
and found Hiibel’s arguments unpersuasive as it affirmed the trial court’s 
verdict.27  Subsequently, in a divided opinion, Hiibel’s Fourth Amendment 
argument was rejected by the Nevada Supreme Court.28  Hiibel’s petition for a 
rehearing was denied before the Supreme Court of the United States granted 
certiorari.29 
Whether or not one could be arrested solely for refusing to identify one’s 
self to law enforcement officers had been a question previously unaddressed by 
the Supreme Court.  Since several jurisdictions have enactments similar to § 
171.123, Hiibel’s case provided the Court with an opportunity to address the 
constitutionality of those provisions.30 
The Supreme Court ultimately upheld Hiibel’s conviction, holding that the 
Nevada statute in question did not violate Hiibel’s rights under either the 
Fourth or Fifth Amendments to the Constitution.31  In doing so, the Court 
created a substantial exception to the law governing seizure by essentially 
 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 182. 
 24. Id. at 181-82 (citing NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.123 (2003)). 
 25. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 181. 
 26. Id. at 182. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See id. at 182-84.  Alabama, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, 
Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, 
New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, Virginia and Wisconsin 
have all enacted “stop and identify” statutes. See infra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 31. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 185, 189-91. 
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allowing police, in some circumstances, to make arrests even when probable 
cause is conspicuously absent.32  In addition to creating a regime where 
innocent persons are afforded less protection than criminals, the Court 
abolished the well known “right to remain silent” in the context of a Terry stop 
and ignored or failed to fully appreciate the numerous problems that will be 
associated with the enforcement of its holding.  This note will analyze the 
history of the relevant legal developments surrounding Hiibel and explore the 
constitutional significance and practical applications of the Court’s holding. 
II.  HISTORY 
The Hiibel decision hinged on whether traditional “stop and identify” 
statutes violate the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures and/or the right against self incrimination guaranteed by 
the Fifth Amendment.33  Several states have enacted versions of a “stop and 
identify” statute.34  Although there are variations, virtually all such enactments 
allow law enforcement officers to demand that a suspect identify himself.35 
 
 32. See Nicholas C. Harbist, Stop and Identify Statutes: A New Form of an Inadequate 
Solution to an Old Problem, 12 RUTGERS L.J., 585, 614 (1981); see also NEV. REV. STAT. § 
171.123; Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 188-89. 
 33. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 182.  
 34. See ALA. CODE § 15-5-30 (1995); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-213 (1997); CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 647(e) (Deering 1974); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 1321 (2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 
1902 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 856.021 (West 2000); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 901.151(2) (West 
2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-36 (2003); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/107-14 (LexisNexis 
2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2402(1)(1995); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 215.1(A) (2003); 
MO. REV. STAT. § 84.710 (2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-401 (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-
829 (1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 594:2 (LexisNexis 2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:6 
(1996); N.M. STAT. § 30-22-3 (2004); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.50 (McKinney 2004); N.D. 
CENT CODE § 29-29-21 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-7-1 (2002); ST. PAUL MINN., LEGIS. CODE 
§ 225.11 (2005), available at http://www.stpaul.gove/code/lc225.html; UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-
15 (2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 1983 (Supp. 2004); 1998 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 968.24 (West). 
 35. See Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 183.  Some such enactments require a suspect to disclose 
information in addition to identity, such as an address.  See ALA. CODE § 15-5-30; CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 647(e); DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 11, § 1902; 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/107-14; KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 22-2402(1); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 215.1(A); MO. REV. STAT. § 84.710; 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-401(2)(a); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-829; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 594:2; 
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.50(1); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29-21; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-7-1; 
ST. PAUL MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 225.11 (2005), available at http://www.stpaul.gove/code/ 
lc225.html; UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-15; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 968.24; see also MASS GEN. LAWS, 
ch. 41, § 98 (1958) (providing that police “may examine all persons abroad whom they have 
reason to suspect of unlawful design, and may demand of them their business abroad,” and that 
“[p]ersons so suspected who do not give a satisfactory account of themselves . . . may be arrested 
. . . .”). 
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A. The Fourth Amendment and the Terry Exception 
The Fourth Amendment protects citizens against unreasonable searches 
and seizures and authorizes a law enforcement officer to make an arrest only 
when he has probable cause to believe a crime has been committed.36  In the 
landmark case of Terry v. Ohio, the Court first considered whether or not law 
enforcement officers have the right to detain a suspect in the absence of 
probable cause.37  Prior to Terry, it was clear that a police officer was 
precluded from seizing an individual unless he possessed the requisite probable 
cause to believe the suspect was involved in criminal activity.38 
In Terry, a plain clothes police officer observed two men acting 
suspiciously.39  The officer would later explain that in light of his years of 
experience as a policeman, he felt that the two men “didn’t look right.”40  After 
observing the actions of the two men, the officer concluded the men were 
planning a burglary.41  The officer approached the men and identified himself 
as a policeman before conducting a frisk of one of the suspects, which 
produced a handgun.42  The man was charged and convicted of carrying a 
concealed weapon.43 
The suspect sought to suppress the weapon from evidence on the grounds 
that the search of his person violated his Fourth Amendment rights.44  The 
Court’s holding represented the first significant exception to the Fourth 
Amendment protections.  It authorized police to conduct a carefully limited 
search of suspects whom they reasonably suspected to be dangerous, even in 
the absence of probable cause.45  The exception recognized by the Court in 
 
 36. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .”). 
 37. 392 U.S. 1,  7-9 (1968) 
 38. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979) (“The term ‘arrest’ [is] synonymous 
with those seizures governed by the Fourth Amendment. While warrants [are] not required in all 
circumstances, the requirement of probable cause, as elaborated in numerous precedents, [is] 
treated as absolute.”). 
 39. Terry, 392 U.S. at 5-6. 
 40. Id. (“He explained that he had developed routine habits of observation over the years and 
that he would ‘stand and watch people or walk and watch people at many intervals of the day.’  
He added: ‘Now, in this case when I looked over they didn’t look right to me at the time.’”). 
 41. Id. at 6 (“[A]fter observing their elaborately casual and oft-repeated reconnaissance of 
the store window . . . he suspected the two men of ‘casing a job, a stick-up . . . .’”). 
 42. Id. at 6-7. 
 43. Id. at 4.  Two of the suspects were arrested and convicted pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code § 
2923.01 (1953), which provides, inter alia, that “[n]o person shall carry a pistol, bowie knife, 
dirk, or other dangerous weapon concealed on or about his person.”  Id. at 4 n.1, 5, 11 n.2 
(quoting OHIO REV. CODE § 2923.01 (1953)). 
 44. Id. at 4-5, 7-8. 
 45. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208-09 (1979); Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. 
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Terry is very narrow, and even after Terry, law enforcement officers may not 
arrest a suspect unless the initial reasonable suspicion seasonally develops into 
probable cause.46  The detentions considered by the Court in Terry have come 
to be known as “Terry stops.”47 
Because the Court has the “responsibility to guard against police conduct 
which is overbearing or harassing, or which trenches upon personal 
security,”48  and because the holding in Terry represented a substantial 
expansion of the investigative authority possessed by police, that Court was 
careful to define the scope of the exception.49  Thus, when considering the 
reasonableness of the intrusion, that Court mandated that the “scope of the 
search must be strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which 
rendered its initiation permissible.”50  Further, that Court was careful to 
emphasize that the “[s]ole justification [of the officer’s search of a person 
whom he has no cause to arrest] is protection of the police officer and others 
nearby, and it must therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably 
designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for 
assault of [the] officer.”51 
B. “Stop and Identify” Statutes 
Because of constitutional concerns, the Supreme Court has imposed 
significant limitations on traditional vagrancy laws, from which modern “stop 
and identify” statutes evolved.52 The first case, which considered the 
constitutionality of such laws, was Papachristou v. Jacksonville in 1972.53  The 
case involved eight defendants from different cases who had all been convicted 
of violating a Jacksonville vagrancy ordinance in a Florida Municipal Court.54  
 
 46. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. 
 47. See U.S. v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 253 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 48. Terry, 392 U.S. at 15. 
 49. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93 (1979). 
 50. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 (citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967)(Fortas, J., 
concurring)); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring); see also 
Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367-68 (1964); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30-
31 (1925). 
 51. Terry, 392 U.S. at 29. 
 52. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177, 183-84 (2004) (citing 15 
Geo. 2, ch. 5, § 2 (1744)). 
 53. 405 U.S. 156 (1972). 
 54. Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 156, 158.  Jacksonville Ordinance Code  § 26—57 provided 
that: 
Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging, common gamblers, 
persons who use juggling or unlawful games or plays, common drunkards, common night 
walkers, thieves, pilferers or pickpockets, traders in stolen property, lewd, wanton and 
lascivious persons, keepers of gambling places, common railers and brawlers, persons 
wandering or strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose or object, 
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At the time of their arrest, four of the defendants had been riding together in 
the same automobile.55  The arresting officer said his suspicion peaked after he 
observed the group near a car lot, which was frequently burglarized.56  
Consequently, each defendant was charged with “prowling by auto.”57 
Two of the other defendants were arrested as they stood on the side of the 
road early one morning.58 The suspects alleged they were waiting for a friend 
who had agreed to loan them his car.59  Local shop owners had observed the 
two and called police because they felt that the two appeared suspicious.60  
Although there was no evidence that a crime had transpired, the police arrested 
the suspects because they had no identification and because the arresting 
officers did not feel like the suspects had provided a satisfactory account of 
their presence.61 
The seventh defendant was pulled over early one morning for speeding.62  
Curiously, the suspect was charged with vagrancy instead of speeding.63  The 
last defendant was arrested as he left a hotel.64  The arresting officer claimed 
that the defendant had a bad reputation, so he summoned the defendant to his 
cruiser with the intention of arresting him unless he could offer a satisfactory 
explanation for what he was up to.65  After the suspect approached the car, he 
was subjected to a search, which yielded a small amount of heroin.66  Among 
other things, he was charged with vagrancy under the Jacksonville ordinance at 
issue.67 
 
habitual loafers, disorderly persons, persons neglecting all lawful business and habitually 
spending their time by frequenting houses of ill fame, gaming houses, or places where 
alcoholic beverages are sold or served, persons able to work but habitually living upon the 
earnings of their wives or minor children shall be deemed vagrants and, upon conviction 
in the Municipal Court shall be punished as provided for Class D offenses. 
Id. at 156-57 n.1. 
 55. Id. at 158-59. 
 56. Id. at 159. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 159. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 160. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id.  The officer testified that the suspect had a reputation for being a drug dealer, a thief 
and a “generally opprobrious character.”  Id.  The officer also testified that he planned to arrest 
Brown unless he could offer a “good explanation for being on the street.”  Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 160-61.  This defendant was charged with disorderly loitering on the street, 
disorderly conduct, and resisting arrest under Jacksonville Ordinance Code § 26-57, in addition to 
a drug charge that was later dropped.  Id. 
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The Court ultimately held that the vagrancy statute was unconstitutional 
and therefore void.68  The Court announced that the statute was too vague, 
because it “fail[ed] to give . . . a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that 
his contemplated conduct [was] forbidden . . . .”69Further, the statute made 
certain activities criminal, “which by modern standards are normally 
innocent.”70  The Court reasoned that the average citizen is not aware of the 
laws against vagrancy and that the law forbade conduct that is viewed by most 
as honest, like “nightwalking,” for example.71  Thus, the overly broad nature of 
the statute made it constitutionally impermissible.72 
In addition to finding the statute unconstitutional on vagueness grounds, 
the Court articulated the concern that the statute “encourage[ed] arbitrary and 
erratic arrests and convictions”73 because it placed almost “unfettered 
discretion . . . in the hands of [law enforcement officers].”74  The Court likened 
the Jacksonville ordinance to a law which provides that all suspicious persons 
are subject to arrest or a law which punishes for “future criminality.”75 
Accordingly, in addition to being too vague, due to the fact a vagrancy 
prosecution could often be a pretext for evading the probable cause 
requirement for arrest, the Jacksonville vagrancy statute was also held to be 
constitutionally inadequate.76 
Seven years later, the Court imposed the first limitations on “stop and 
identify” statutes because of constitutional concerns.77  In Brown v. Texas, the 
Court was presented with the opportunity to rule on whether the Constitution 
allowed a legislative body to enact a statute that makes silence a crime in the 
midst of a Terry stop.78  In Brown, two police officers observed a man walking 
through an alley which was known for drug trafficking.79  The man was 
stopped by the police, who demanded that he disclose his identity and explain 
what he was doing.80  The arresting officer maintained that the man appeared 
suspicious, although he could not articulate any specific wrongdoing and he 
 
 68. Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 162, 171. 
 69. Id.  at 162. 
 70. Id. at 163. 
 71. Id. at 162-63. 
 72. Id. at 162, 165-68, 171. 
 73. Id. at 162 (citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Herndon v. Lowry, 306 U.S. 
242 (1937)). 
 74. Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 168. 
 75. Id. at 169. 
 76. Id. at 168-71. 
 77. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 49, 51-53 (1979). 
 78. Id. at 48. 
 79. Id. at 48-49. 
 80. Id. 
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admitted that he did not suspect that the man was armed.81  When the man 
refused to cooperate, he was arrested for “violation of a [Texas statute] which 
makes it a criminal act for a person to refuse to give his name and address to an 
officer ‘who has lawfully stopped him and requested the information.’”82 
Unfortunately, the Court avoided ruling on the ultimate issue of the 
constitutionality of the law itself and decided instead to resolve the case on 
other grounds.83  The Court found that the arresting officer had violated the 
suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights because the police officer did not have 
reasonable suspicion to believe that the suspect had committed a crime.84  The 
Court reasoned that the detention of the subject for the purpose of compelling 
identification constituted a seizure that implicated the Fourth Amendment.85 
The Court concluded the Fourth Amendment demands that such “a seizure . . . 
be based on specific, objective facts indicating that society’s legitimate 
interests require [such action], or that the seizure . . . be carried out pursuant to 
a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual 
officers.”86 
There was no claim that the officers had effectuated the detention based on 
reasonable suspicion that the suspect was involved in criminal activity.87  The 
Court emphasized that “absent[t] any basis for suspecting . . . misconduct, the 
balance between the public interest [in crime prevention] and appellant’s right 
to personal security and privacy tilts in favor of freedom from police 
interference.”88  Ultimately, because the officer was unable to satisfactorily 
articulate why he made the determination the suspect was “suspicious,” the 
situation did not warrant a reasonable suspicion that the suspect had been 
engaged in a crime.89  Therefore, the detention was illegal.90  In the absence of 
the requisite reasonable suspicion, the detention and subsequent questioning of 
the subject pursuant to the state statute amounted to a violation of the suspect’s 
Fourth Amendment rights.91 
 
 81. Id. at 49.  One of the arresting officers explained that the circumstances “looked 
suspicious and we had never seen that subject in that area before.”  Id. 
 82. Id. (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.02(a) (Vernon 1974)).  TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. 
§ 38.02(a) of 1974 provided in relevant part that “[a] person commits an offense if he 
intentionally refuses to report or gives a false report of his name and residence address to a peace 
officer who has lawfully stopped him and requested the information.”  Id. at 49 n.1 (quoting § 
38.02(a)). 
 83. See Brown, 443 U.S. at 53. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 50. 
 86. Id. at 51 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979)). 
 87. Id. at 51-52. 
 88. Id. at 52. 
 89. Brown, 443 U.S. at 52-53. 
 90. Id. at 53. 
 91. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
164 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:155 
In 1983, the Court decided Kolender v. Lawson, which reaffirmed the 
limitations imposed by the Court in Papachristou.92  At issue was a California 
“stop and identify” statute, which required “persons . . . who wander on the 
streets to provide a ‘credible and reliable’ identification and to account for 
their presence when requested by a [police] officer.”93  The statute mandated 
that anyone on the streets at night must be prepared to articulate a reason for 
their presence and that refusal to do so or failure to identify one’s self 
constituted a misdemeanor.94  A man named Lawson had been arrested or 
detained numerous times between 1975 and 1977 pursuant to the California 
enactment in question.95  He maintained his only encounters with law 
enforcement officers were because of the “stop and identify” statute at issue.96 
The officers imposing the detentions provided several accounts of the 
various circumstances justifying the stops.97  Essentially, those justifications 
were the same: police observed Lawson at night in or near vicinities that police 
classified as high crime areas.98  Lawson eventually brought suit in federal 
court seeking to have the statute declared unconstitutional and to have its 
enforcement enjoined.99 
Lawson prevailed on the constitutional issue in district court and the 
holding was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.100  The Ninth 
Circuit expressed the view that the California enactment violated the Fourth 
Amendment’s protection against unreasonable seizures and emphasized that 
such a statute was prone to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.101  The 
defendant law enforcement agency in question appealed to the Supreme 
 
 92. 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). 
 93. Id. at 353-54. 
 94. Id. at 353 n.1 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(e) (West 1979)).  The current CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 647(e) (West 2005), which is similar to the 1970 version, provides: 
[e]very person who commits any of the following acts is guilty of disorderly conduct, a 
misdemeanor: . . . (e) Who loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to place 
without apparent reason or business and who refuses to identify himself and to account for 
his presence when requested by any peace officer to do so, if the surrounding 
circumstances [are such as to] indicate to a reasonable [man] that the public safety 
demands [such] identification. 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(e) (West 2005). 
 95. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 354.  Although there was no finding made by the District Court 
regarding prior detainments of Lawson made pursuant to CAL. PENAL CODE § 647, the record 
contained testimony of police officers describing the circumstances surrounding stops of Lawson.  
Id. at n.2 354.  In general, the justification given by police was that Lawson was walking alone 
late at night in or around high crime areas.  Id. (citing the transcript at 207, 266-67). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. (citing the transcript at 207, 266-67). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 354. 
 100. Id. at 354-55. 
 101. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 355. 
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Court.102  The Court affirmed, noting that in addition to failing to provide the 
average citizen with notice as to what was required of them under the statute, 
the statute was constitutionally problematic because “[any] individual, whom 
police may think is suspicious but do not have probable cause to believe has 
committed a crime, is entitled to continue to walk the public streets ‘only at the 
whim of any police officer’ who happens to stop that individual.”103  The 
Supreme Court noted that it was well established that law enforcement officers 
cannot force answers to questions and that the statute represented “a 
convenient tool for ‘harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting 
officials, against particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure.’”104  
Thus, the Court’s concerns were similar to those discussed in Papachristou. 
Interestingly, Justice Brennan authored a concurring opinion in which he 
stated that although the statute does not pass muster because of vagueness, 
even if that shortcoming was addressed by a legislative body, the statute would 
nonetheless violate the Fourth Amendment.105  While permitting law 
enforcement officers to arrest an individual solely on the basis of reasonable 
suspicion would advance the policy objective of the promotion of public 
safety, that objective must be weighed against the objective of protecting 
personal liberties.106  Permitting an arrest in the absence of probable cause 
might advance the effectiveness of police investigations, but it would also 
represent a substantial increase in the level of intrusiveness society must be 
prepared to permit.107 
Justice Brennan emphasized that although law enforcement officers with 
reasonable suspicion may detain and question someone in order to advance 
their investigation, per Terry,108 
[The police] may not compel an answer, and [the police] must allow the 
person to leave after a reasonably brief period of time unless the 
information [gained allows the suspicion to develop into] probable 
cause sufficient to justify an arrest.  California cannot abridge this 
constitutional rule by making it a crime to refuse to answer police 
questions during a Terry encounter, any more than it could abridge the 
protections of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments by making it a crime to 
refuse to answer police questions once a suspect has been taken into 
custody.109 
 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 353-54, 357-58. 
 104. Id. at 360 n.9 (quoting Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 n.6 (1969)); id. at 360 
(quoting Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972)). 
 105. Id. at 362 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 106. See id. at 365-66. 
 107. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 365-66. 
 108. Id. at 364 
 109. Id. at 366-67. 
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Accordingly, Justice Brennan concluded, that the statute in question would 
violate the Fourth Amendment even if its current shortcomings, namely 
vagueness, were addressed.110 
C. The Fifth Amendment 
The Fifth Amendment provides in relevant part “that “[n]o person shall 
be . . . compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. . . .”111  
In order for a statement to implicate the Fifth Amendment, the Court has held 
that the statement must be “testimonial, incriminating and compelled.”112The 
essence of the Amendment’s privilege is to prevent a situation where a suspect 
must face the “trilemma of self accusation, perjury or contempt.”113 
With respect to the “testimonial” prong of the Fifth Amendment analysis, 
the Court helped define this term in Pennsylvania v. Muniz.114  That Court 
considered whether certain statements made by a DWI suspect were 
testimonial and, therefore, protected by the privilege against self 
incrimination.115  The DWI suspect in Muniz was asked a variety of questions 
including an inquiry about the date of his sixth birthday.116  Some of the 
suspect’s answers were slurred and the suspect was unable to provide the 
police with the date of his sixth birthday.117  The Court held that the Fifth 
Amendment’s safeguards “protect[] an accused only from being compelled to 
testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a 
testimonial or communicative nature,” but not “from being compelled by the 
State to produce ‘real or physical evidence.’”118 The Court defined a 
testimonial statement as one that “explicitly or implicitly, relate[s] a factual 
assertion or disclose[s] information.”119 
Accordingly, the Court found that the suspect’s answers to the questions 
that had been directed at him were not protected merely because the slurred 
nature of his speech supported the inference that he was intoxicated.120  The 
slurred nature of the suspect’s speech was not testimonial in nature.121  
However, the suspect’s response to the birthday question “was incriminating, 
 
 110. Id. at 369. 
 111. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 112. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177, 189 (2004) (citing 
United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 34-38 (2000)). 
 113. Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 212 (1988) (citing Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 
378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964)). 
 114. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990). 
 115. Id. at 584. 
 116. Id. at 586. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 589 (citing Schmerber v, California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966)). 
 119. Id. (quoting Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988)). 
 120. Muntz, 496 U.S. at 590. 
 121. Id. at 590-91. 
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not just because of his delivery, but also because [the] . . . content [of his 
answer supported an inference] that his mental state was confused.”122  His 
response was testimonial because he was required “to communicate an express 
or implied assertion of fact or belief . . . .”123 
Prior to Muniz, our courts had provided some guidance in determining 
whether certain acts were testimonial in nature.124  For example, in Schmerber 
v. California, the Court held that a blood sample taken from a DWI suspect 
was admissible and not the subject of Fifth Amendment concerns.125 This was 
because the act of giving blood was not “testimonial.”126  Similarly, it was held 
that compelling a handwriting sample did not run afoul of the Fifth 
Amendment because such an act was not testimonial.127 
With respect to the “incriminating” prong of the analysis, it has been held 
that a statement is incriminating, and therefore implicates the Fifth 
Amendment, if the statement “furnish[es] a link in the chain of evidence 
needed to prosecute.”128  A statement is considered to be incriminating for the 
purposes of the Fifth Amendment if it is “[likely to be] used in a criminal 
prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be [used in a 
prosecution].”129  Thus, it was held that “[the Fifth Amendment’s] protection 
[applies whenever] compelled statements that ‘lead to the discovery of 
incriminating evidence even though the statements themselves are not 
incriminating and are not introduced into evidence.”130 
 
 122. Id. at 592 (emphasis in original). 
 123. Id. at 597. 
 124. See generally Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967); Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757, 760-65 (1966). 
 125. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 761 
 126. Id. (“We hold that the privilege protects an accused only from being compelled to testify 
against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative 
nature, and that the withdrawal of blood and use of the analysis in question . . . did not involve 
compulsion to these ends.”). 
 127. Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 266-67.  The Court directed that: 
The taking of the exemplars did not violate petitioner’s Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination.  The privilege reaches only compulsion of “an accused’s 
communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which 
are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one’s 
papers,” and not “compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of  ‘real or 
physical evidence’. . . .” 
Id. at 266 (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64).  The Court went on to note that “[a] mere 
handwriting exemplar, in contrast to the content of what is written, like the voice or body itself, is 
an identifying physical characteristic outside its protection.”  Id. at 266-67 (citing United States v. 
Wade 388 U.S., 218, 222-23 (1967)). 
 128. Hoffmann v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951). 
 129. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972). 
 130. United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 37 (2000). 
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III.  DISCUSSION 
A. The Hiibel Decision 
Hiibel was initially tried in the Justice Court of Union Township, where 
the court held Hiibel’s refusal to identify himself to a police officer constituted 
a violation of the subject statute.131  Hiibel was convicted and ordered to pay a 
fine.132  Subsequently, Hiibel appealed to Nevada’s Sixth Judicial District 
Court, which affirmed the lower court holding that Hiibel’s conviction under 
the statute did not violate his constitutional rights under either the Fourth or 
Fifth Amendments.133  The Nevada Supreme Court rejected Hiibel’s Fourth 
Amendment challenge, holding that the policy objectives promoted by the 
statute outweighed any intrusion on Hiibel’s privacy.134  Hiibel asked the 
Supreme Court of the United States to resolve his Fifth Amendment claim.  
Certiorari was granted.135 
1. The Majority Opinion 
The Hiibel case represents the first time the Supreme Court has addressed 
the legality of “stop and identify statutes” since Kolender.136  The Court’s 
majority opinion was authored by Justice Kennedy.137  The opinion began by 
discussing “stop and identify statutes” generally, noting that the enactments 
have their roots in vagrancy laws and that there are many versions of such 
statutes with the penalties for violations varying from being charged with a 
misdemeanor to no penalty whatsoever.138 
Justice Kennedy proceeded to distinguish the instant case from other cases, 
such as Kolender,139 which found similar enactments constitutionally 
inadequate.140  It is noteworthy that although the Court had addressed the 
legality of laws very similar to the one in question in Hiibel, those cases were 
always resolved on a separate basis such as vagueness.141  Justice Kennedy 
asserted that the Nevada statute was distinguishable from the California statute 
 
 131. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177, 182 (2004). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id.  
 134. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. County of Humbolt, 59 P.3d 1201, 1205 (Nev. 
2002) (“[W]e conclude that any intrusion on privacy caused by NRS 171.123(3) is outweighed by 
the benefits to officers and community safety.”). 
 135. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 182. 
 136. See id. at 184-85. 
 137. Id. at 180. 
 138. Id. at 183. 
 139. Id. at 184-85. 
 140. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 353-54, 358, 361 (1983). 
 141. See, e.g., id. at 353-54; Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51-53 (1979). 
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that was at issue in Kolender.142  The cornerstone of the Kolender opinion was 
the fact that the statute was overly vague because it required citizens to give 
“reliable and credible” information as to their identity, which was undefined by 
the statute.143  It was impossible to ascertain what was meant by “reliable and 
credible” and, thus, impossible to determine when such a provision had been 
violated.144  In contrast, the Nevada statute at the center of the controversy in 
the instant case was characterized by Justice Kennedy as “narrower and more 
precise.”145  All that was apparently required by the Nevada statute was the 
disclosure of the suspect’s name, not the production of verifying identity 
documents.146 
After distinguishing the Hiibel statute from other statutes previously 
examined by the Court, the next step in the majority’s analysis focused on 
Hiibel’s Fourth Amendment argument.147  The Fourth Amendment provides, in 
relevant part, that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated . . . .”148  In general, law enforcement officers are permitted to 
ask one to disclose his identity without creating a Fourth Amendment issue 
because such a request does not qualify as a seizure subject to the 
amendment’s protections.149  However, the Court noted that it is well 
established that the Fourth Amendment precludes law enforcement officers 
from searching or detaining an individual unless the officer has probable cause 
to believe that the person has been involved in criminal activity, except under 
the carefully defined exceptions outlined in Terry.150 
With respect to the Fourth Amendment, the reasonableness of a seizure is 
usually determined through a balancing test which considers the magnitude of 
the intrusion versus the policy objectives advanced by allowing the seizure.151 
The majority stated there were several benefits involved in allowing police to 
compel disclosure of a suspect’s identity during a Terry stop.152  Such 
 
 142. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 184-85. 
 143. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 353-54; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(e) (West 2005). 
 144. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358. 
 145. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 184. 
 146. Id. at 185. 
 147. Id. at 185-89. 
 148. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .”). 
 149. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 185 (citing INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 873, 881 (1975)). 
 150. See id. 
 151. Id. at 187-88 (“The reasonableness of a seizure under the Fourth Amendment is 
determined by ‘balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights against its 
promotion of legitimate government interests.”  (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 
(1979))). 
 152. Id. at 186. 
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information would allow police to determine if the subject was wanted in 
connection with another, unrelated crime.153  Further, allowing police to make 
inquiries pertaining to identity would promote the policy objective of 
increasing the safety of law enforcement officers.154  Such information might 
alert the officers to conditions such as mental deficiency or violent 
disposition.155  This would help police determine what degree of caution was 
appropriate for a particular situation.156  The majority contended that, in the 
instant case, it would have been “particularly” beneficial for the police to know 
if Hiibel had a history of domestic violence.157  Such information would have 
aided their determination as to how to proceed with the investigation and as to 
the level of caution to be used.158  The majority maintained information 
pertaining to identity could actually benefit a suspect in some circumstances.159  
The majority found that there were situations where such information would 
serve to exculpate the individual and allow police to focus their investigation 
on a different suspect.160   
The majority conceded that numerous historical statements made by the 
Court in other cases appeared to suggest that police officers cannot compel a 
suspect to identify himself during a Terry stop.161  The Court, however, 
ultimately rejected Hiibel’s Fourth Amendment argument.162  It should be 
noted that it was stated in both Terry163 and Berkmer164 that a suspect cannot 
 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 186. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. See id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 186. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  Here, Justice White declared in his concurrence that” 
There is nothing in the Constitution which prevents a policeman from addressing 
questions to anyone on the streets.  Absent special circumstances, the person approached 
may not be detained or frisked but may refuse to cooperate and go on his way.  However, 
given the proper circumstances . . . the person may be briefly detained against his will 
while pertinent questions are directed to him. Of course, the person stopped is not obliged 
to answer, answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an 
arrest. 
Id. at 34 (White, J., concurring). 
 164. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984).  With respect to the investigatory stops 
permitted by Terry, the Court directed: 
An officer may ask the detainee a moderate number of questions to determine his identity 
and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions.  But the 
detainee is not obliged to respond.  And, unless the detainee’s answers provide the officer 
with probable cause to arrest him, he must then be released. 
Id. at 439-40. 
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be forced to answer any questions during a Terry stop, and that a suspect’s 
refusal to answer questions does not furnish police with a basis for arrest.165  
Similarly, in Florida v. Royer, the Supreme Court declared that, while a 
suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights are not violated when an officer accosts 
him for questioning, no duty to answer attaches.166  “The person approached 
. . . need not answer any question put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen 
to the questions at all and may go on his way.”167 
In the instant case the Court decided not to treat its above holdings as 
controlling.168  The Court reasoned that the requirement that a suspect identify 
himself during a Terry stop was not mandated by the Constitution.169  Rather, 
it was mandated by the Nevada “stop and identify” statute in question.170  
Accordingly, the Court further reasoned that the above holdings did not 
actually address the question then before the Court, which was whether a state 
could force its citizens to identify themselves to law enforcement officers.171  
The Court ultimately declared the Fourth Amendment concerns had to be 
balanced against the utility provided by the statute in question.172  It held that 
any intrusion by the statute on one’s Constitutional rights were minimal in 
light of the legitimate interests the enactment promoted.173  Further, the Court 
emphasized the statute did not fundamentally change the stops allowed by 
Terry, and did not affect the intrusiveness of the stop in any meaningful 
way.174  Because the Court felt the governmental interests promoted by the 
statute outweighed any intrusion on personal privacy, and because the statute 
did not fundamentally change the nature of a Terry stop, the Nevada statute did 
not violate the Fourth Amendment.175 
In addition to declaring that the statute in question violated the 
Constitution’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, Hiibel 
also advanced the argument that the statute effectively evaded the requirement 
that an arrest may not be based on anything less than probable cause.176  Hiibel 
maintained the Nevada statute basically mandated that a suspect’s silence 
alone was sufficient to evolve suspicion into probable cause and created a 
pretext for arrest when probable cause did not seasonably develop.177  The 
 
 165. Terry, 392 U.S. at 34 (White, J., concurring); see Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439-40. 
 166. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1983). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 187. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 187-88 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)). 
 173. Id. at 188. 
 174. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 188. 
 175. Id. at 187-88. 
 176. Id. at 188. 
 177. Id. 
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Supreme Court disagreed.178  It addressed this concern by stating “the request 
for identification was ‘reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which 
justified’ the stop.”179  The Court felt the request was a commonsense inquiry 
and not an effort to procure grounds for an arrest in the face of inadequate 
evidence.180  Accordingly, the Court declared “[t]he stop, the request, and the 
State’s requirement of a response did not contravene the guarantees of the 
Fourth Amendment.”181 
The Court next turned its attention to Hiibel’s Fifth Amendment 
argument.182  The Fifth Amendment protects individuals from self-imposed 
incrimination.183 Hiibel’s contention was essentially that compelled 
identification can constitute a testimonial communication that invokes Fifth 
Amendment protection.184  The Respondents challenged the applicability of 
the Fifth Amendment to such statements by asserting that such 
communications are not truly “testimonial,” but the Court declined to resolve 
that issue because the Court felt it was unnecessary.185 
Regardless of whether the communication in question was testimonial, the 
Court reasoned that the Fifth Amendment challenge was unpersuasive in the 
instant case because “disclosure . . . presented no reasonable danger of 
incrimination.”186  The Court contended the Fifth Amendment was only 
applicable when “reasonable ground to apprehend danger to the witness from 
his being compelled to answer” exists, and that “the danger . . . [had to] be real 
and appreciable . . . not a danger of an imaginary and unsubstantial 
character.”187  In the instant case, the Court felt that Hiibel’s refusal to identify 
himself was not based upon any appreciable danger that the information 
disclosed would be used to incriminate him.188  Accordingly, the Court 
rejected Hiibel’s Fifth Amendment challenge.189 
Interestingly, the majority did acknowledge that: 
A case may arise where there is a substantial allegation that furnishing 
identity at the time of [the] stop would have given the police a link in 
the chain of evidence needed to convict the individual of a separate 
offense.  In that case, the [C]ourt can then consider whether the 
 
 178. Id. at 188-89. 
 179. Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)). 
 180. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 188-89. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 189-91. 
 183. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 34-38 (2000). 
 184. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 189. 
 185. Id. at 189. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 190 (quoting Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 599-600 (1896)). 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 190-91. 
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privilege applies, and, if the Fifth Amendment has been violated, what 
remedy must follow.190 
The Court, however, expressly declined to resolve those questions in the 
instant case.191 
2. Dissent I 
A dissenting opinion was authored by Justice Stevens, who concentrated 
on Fifth Amendment concerns.192  Because the majority declined to address 
the issue of the testimonial nature of the statements at issue, Justice Stevens 
concentrated his analysis on the incriminating nature of the statements.193  The 
majority’s central justification for allowing compelled identification in this 
case was that Hiibel had no reasonable fear that disclosure of his identity 
would incriminate him.194  Historically, however, the Court has defined 
“incriminating” in a much more expansive way.195  The Court has defined an 
incriminating statement as one that may lead to evidence that could be used in 
a criminal prosecution even if the statement “itself is not inculpatory.”196  With 
respect to the definition historically employed by the Supreme Court, and 
given that Hiibel was a suspect in a criminal investigation, it seems clear he 
was merely exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege by refusing to answer 
questions posed to him by a law enforcement officer.197 
Justice Stevens further asserted that if one is to accept the proposition that 
the admission of one’s name poses no actual and appreciable fear of 
prosecution, it becomes unclear why disclosure is required in the first place.198  
If knowledge of one’s identity fails to further the investigative process in any 
significant way, surely there can be no justifiable reason to infringe upon or 
compromise one’s constitutional rights.199  Accordingly, Justice Stevens 
 
 190. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 191. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 191-96 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 193. Id. at 195-96. 
 194. Id. at 195. 
 195. Id.; see also, United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 38 (2000) (asserting that “testimony 
that communicates information that may ‘lead to incriminating evidence’ is privileged even if the 
information itself is not inculpatory.” (quoting Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 208 n.6 
(1988))) (emphasis added); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972) (defining 
incriminating to include any disclosure that “could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead 
to other evidence that might be so used.”); Hoffmann v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) 
(noting that communication can be defined as incriminating if it would “furnish a link in the chain 
of evidence needed to prosecute” the suspect.). 
 196. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 38 (citing Doe, 487 U.S. at 208 n.6). 
 197. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 195 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 198. Id. at 196. 
 199. Id. 
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believed it seemed illogical to make the refusal to identify one’s self a crime if 
police really did not need the information anyway.200 
3. Dissent II 
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg delivered the 
second dissenting opinion.201  This opinion focused on the numerous historical 
statements made by the Court over the course of decades which clearly 
indicated disclosure of one’s identity could not be compelled during a Terry 
stop.202  In Terry, Justice White wrote that in the case of an investigatory stop, 
“the person stopped is not obliged to answer, answers may not be compelled, 
and refusal to answer [does not furnish a] basis for an arrest.”203  Likewise, in 
Brown, the Court noted that the trial court judge said, “I’m sure [the officers 
conducting a Terry stop] should ask everything they possibly could find out.  
What I’m asking is what’s the State’s interest in putting a man in jail because 
he doesn’t want to answer . . . .”204  Similarly, the Court in Berkemer v. 
McCarty wrote that an “officer may ask the [Terry] detainee a moderate 
[amount] of questions to determine his identity and to try to obtain information 
confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions.  But the detainee is not 
obliged to respond.”205  In Kolender, Justice Breyer stated in his concurring 
opinion that a Terry suspect “must be free to . . . decline to answer the 
questions put to him.”206 
These historical statements and holdings made by the Supreme Court 
represent decades of established law.207  Justice Brennan stated he was leery of 
riddling a clear rule with exceptions.208  Thus, he felt there had been a failure 
by the majority in Hiibel to demonstrate a legitimate reason to disturb well 
settled law.209 
IV.  AUTHOR’S ANALYSIS 
The holding in Hiibel represents a failure by the Court to recognize the 
problems associated with the enforcement of its holding.  The decision also 
 
 200. See id. 
 201. Id. at 197 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 202. Id. at 197-98 
 203. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (White, J., concurring). 
 204. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 54 (1979) (emphasis in original). 
 205. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984) (emphasis added). 
 206. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 365 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 207. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 198 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 208. See id. at 199. 
 209. Id.  Justice Breyer asserts in his dissent that historical precedents established by the 
Court are “while technically dicta. . .the kind of strong dicta that the legal community typically 
takes as a statement of the law.  And that law has remained undisturbed for more than 20 years.  
There is no good reason now to reject this generation-old statement of the law.”  Id. at 198. 
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exemplifies the continuing emergence of Justice Thomas as a man whose 
words and personal history diverge in a way that defies explanation.  Logic 
dictates that many facets of the enforcement of “stop and identify” statutes will 
be problematic and that the new Hiibel police power will give law enforcement 
officers unfettered reign to utilize such laws in discriminatory ways. 
One issue presented by the Court’s examination of the Hiibel case is its 
seeming failure to appreciate the problematic applications of its holding.  In 
conducting its Fourth Amendment analysis, the Court observed that “[t]he 
reasonableness of a seizure under the Fourth Amendment is determined ‘by 
balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against 
its promotion of legitimate government interests.’”210  The Court held that the 
statute at issue satisfied this standard and was therefore constitutional because 
it had “an immediate relation to the purpose, rationale, and practical demands 
of a Terry stop.”211  The majority declared that allowing compelled disclosure 
of one’s name, even in the absence of probable cause, “promotes the strong 
government interest in solving crimes and bringing offenders to justice.”212  
These statements raise the following question: how is the government’s 
interest in solving crimes or bringing offenders to justice served by compelling 
disclosure of information that will do neither except in rare circumstances? 
It is important to emphasize that there is absolutely nothing contained in 
the subject statute which would prevent an individual from providing a law 
enforcement officer with a false name or giving other false information while 
the officer is exercising the Hiibel powers.  Requiring one to provide some 
type of documentation to verify the information provided would be an obvious 
safeguard, but the Court was clearly not prepared to interpret the statute as 
sanctioning such a requirement.213  While Nevada Statute § 171.123(3) does 
require a suspect to disclose his name under the proper circumstances, the 
statute also expressly mandates that a suspect “may not be compelled to 
answer any other inquiry of any peace officer.”214  Thus, when one considers 
that all that is required by the statute is disclosure of a name, and that answers 
 
 210. Id. at 187-88 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)). 
 211. Id. at 188. 
 212. Id. at 186 (citing United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985)). 
 213. See Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 185.  The United States Supreme Court noted that “the Nevada 
Supreme Court has interpreted NRS § 171.123(3) to require only that a suspect disclose his 
name.”  Id.  The Nevada Supreme Court expressly stated that “[t]he suspect is not required to 
provide private details about his background, but merely to state his name to an officer when 
reasonable suspicion exists.”  Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. County of Humbolt, 59 
P.3d 1201, 1206 (Nev. 2002).  The United States Supreme Court continued by asserting that “the 
statute does not require a suspect to give the officer a driver’s license or any other document.  
Provided that the suspect either states his name or communicates is to the officer by other means 
. . . the statute is satisfied and no violation occurs.”  Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 185 (citing Hiibel, 59 
P.3d at 1206-07). 
 214. NEV. REV. STAT § 171.123 (2003) (emphasis added). 
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to other questions or the production of identity documents cannot be 
demanded, it is unclear how the statute effectively promotes the policy 
objective of crime prevention. 
Justice Kennedy suggested that public policy objectives are furthered by 
“stop and identify” statutes because knowledge of a suspect’s identity may 
actually exculpate a suspect and allow for a more prudent expenditure of 
limited investigatory resources.215  However, it seems clear that mere 
knowledge of one’s identity, without more, would almost never be sufficient to 
eliminate that person as a suspect.  Obviously, if an individual can demonstrate 
he is the victim of the crime being investigated, that should be adequate to 
disqualify him as a suspect.  However, from a practical standpoint, merely 
stating one’s name and claiming to be the victim of the crime being 
investigated would not be adequate to exculpate a subject.  Certainly, some 
form of verification, or identification, such as a driver’s license, would be 
required by the law enforcement officer.  It is difficult to imagine a situation 
where a police officer would simply take a suspect’s word for the proposition 
that he was an innocent victim without requiring more in the way of additional 
facts or evidence. 
As noted, documentation confirming one’s identity is not required by the 
statute in question.216  As the majority stated, “the statute does not require a 
suspect to give the officer a driver’s license or any other document.”217  Thus, 
it appears, contrary to the holding of the Court, a mere statement of one’s 
identity will virtually never be enough to absolve an individual who is the 
target of a criminal investigation.  Accordingly, compelled disclosure of 
identity does not truly serve the purposes the Court says it does.  Essentially, 
 
 215. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 186 (“[K]nowing identity may help clear a suspect and allow the 
police to concentrate their efforts elsewhere.”). 
 216. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.123 (2003). 
 217. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 185.  Several other jurisdictions have enacted statutes similar to NEV. 
REV. STAT. § 171.123, which mandate that a suspect must identify himself but do not require the 
production of identity documents.  See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-213 (1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
11 § 1321(6) (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 856.021 (West 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 901.151(2) 
(West 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-36 (2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:6 (1996); N.M 
STAT. § 30-22-3 (2004); VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 24, § 1983 (2004).  Some jurisdictions have 
enactments which require a suspect to disclose both his name and address but do not require the 
production of identity documents.  See ALA. CODE § 15-5-30 (1995); CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(e) 
(West 1999); DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 11, § 1902 (2001); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/107-14 
(LexisNexis 2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2402(1) (1995); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 
215.1(A) (2003); ST. PAUL MN, LEGIS. CODE § 225.11 (2005), available at 
http://www.stpaul.gov/code/lc225.html; MO. ANN. STAT. § 84.710 (West 1998); MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 46-5-401(2)(a) (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-829 (1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 594:2 
(2003); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.50(1) (McKinney 2004); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29-21 
(1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-7-1 (2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-15 (2003); WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 968.24 (West 1998). 
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the Court has disregarded the absence of safeguards to prevent one from 
providing false information and has overestimated the usefulness of a suspect’s 
name absent further verification.  The majority failed to recognize, or at least 
failed to discuss or explain, this problematic application of its holding. 
The Court further held that providing a name to police officers served the 
legitimate interest of crime prevention because the disclosure alone might alert 
the officer that the suspect is wanted for another, unrelated crime.218  Such 
reasoning overlooks the protections afforded to citizens by the Fifth 
Amendment’s prohibition against self incrimination.  Mandating disclosure 
because disclosure alone may inform police that the suspect is wanted in 
connection with another crime would seem to clearly violate the protections 
afforded by the Fifth Amendment.219  Thus, the logic employed by the Court is 
contradictory in that the very justification that is used to argue that the statute 
does not violate the Fourth Amendment necessarily involves a violation of the 
Fifth Amendment.  Additionally, for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment, 
the Court maintained that knowledge of a suspect’s identity was essential to 
prevent crime and to promote the safety of police officers.220  This knowledge 
was found to be so important that the Court held the policy interests promoted 
by requiring disclosure outweighed any infringement on a suspect’s individual 
liberties.221  Alternatively, for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, the Court 
held that knowledge of a suspect’s identity was largely inconsequential and 
was likely to be useful only in “unusual circumstances.”222  Thus, the Court’s 
assessment of the usefulness of one’s name changed in order to accommodate 
its own analysis.223 
It is difficult to correlate the position that policy favors upholding the 
statute because compelled disclosure may warn police of the suspect’s 
involvement in unrelated crimes with the fact that the majority expressly 
 
 218. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 186. 
 219. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Hiibel 542 U.S. at 199 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[A] 
name itself . . . will sometimes provide the police with ‘a link in the chain of evidence needed to 
convict the individual of a separate offense.’”); Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 480,486 
(1951) (citing Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950)) (noting that any communication which 
facilitates a prosecution implicates the Fifth Amendment).  Presumably, this would include 
communications that would aid a conviction of an unrelated offense as well.  Cf. Hoffman, 341 
U.S. at 486-87. 
 220. See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177, 186-88 (2004). 
 221. Id. at 188. 
 222. Id. at 191. 
 223. For a more detailed discussion of the inconsistent nature of the Court’s assessment of the 
usefulness of a name, see M. Christine Klein, A Bird Called Hiibel: The Criminalization of 
Silence, 2004 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 357 (2004), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/scr/docs/ 
2004/birdcalledhiibel.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2006). 
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declined to address the constitutionality of such a scenario.224  Justice Kennedy 
noted that “a case may arise where there is a substantial allegation that 
furnishing identity at the time of a stop would have given the police a link in 
the chain of evidence needed to convict the individual of a separate 
offense.”225  However, the majority failed to discuss what the appropriate 
remedy would be in such a case and ignored this issue entirely.226  What about 
the “unusual”227 case where a subject must choose between sanctions under a 
“stop and identify” statute and incriminating himself?  The Court suggests that 
suspects situated like Hiibel should be able to articulate how disclosure of 
one’s identity could be used against such person.228  However, it is apparent 
that any sufficient explanation in this context would necessarily be 
incriminating. 
The Court’s holding in Hiibel creates the type of dilemma the Fifth 
Amendment was designed to avoid.  Scenarios will inevitably arise wherein a 
suspect must either maintain silence and be prosecuted pursuant to a “stop and 
identify” statute or disclose his identity and expose himself to possible 
sanctions via an incriminating statement.  Hiibel’s case is distinguishable from 
other situations where silence can result in criminal sanctions, because in such 
situations, there is a determination made that the compelled testimony will not 
be used against the individual, even if it is incriminating. 
The Court’s holding in Hiibel essentially mandates that police officers 
must make a determination concerning the incriminating nature of the 
disclosure of a suspect’s identity.  From a practical standpoint, it is impossible 
for police to accurately make such a determination during a Terry stop because 
Police will have no way of knowing whether the disclosure will “furnish a link 
in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute” until after the disclosure has 
been made. 229  In such a case, what would be an appropriate remedy?  When 
one’s name may serve to incriminate the suspect, and an officer demands that 
the suspect reveal it, what should occur thereafter?  Although the Court 
declined to address this issue, it seems unlikely that the Court would allow the 
suspect to avoid prosecution for the underlying case.  Therefore, in the interest 
 
 224. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 191 (Justice Kennedy acknowledges that a scenario where disclosure 
would bolster a conviction for a unrelated offense, but asserts “[w]e need not resolve those 
questions here.”). 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. (“In that case, the court can then consider whether the privilege applies, and, if the 
Fifth Amendment has been violated, what remedy must follow.”). 
 227. Id. at 179. 
 228. See id. at 190. (“[P]etitioner’s refusal to disclose his name was not based on any 
articulated real and appreciable fear that his name would be used to incriminate him . . . [e]ven 
today, petitioner does not explain how the disclosure of his name could have been used against 
him in a criminal case.”). 
 229. Id. 
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of justice, it would seem fundamental that when it is unclear if any statement 
made by a suspect would be incriminating, we should proceed under the 
presumption that it would be in order to be consistent the spirit of the Fifth 
Amendment. 
When the Court announced that the subject statute satisfied its balancing 
test because it had “an immediate relation to the purpose, rationale, and 
practical demands of a Terry stop,” it appeared to disregard the justification for 
the Terry exception. 230  It is important for one to consider the reasons and 
rationale behind permitting such an intrusion in the first place.  In Terry, the 
Court allowed police to perform a frisk of a suspect in the absence of probable 
cause in order to protect the safety of the officer.231  The Court was careful to 
emphasize that a seizure in the absence of probable cause for arrest is justified 
only if the officer suspects that a subject is armed and dangerous.232  The 
purpose of the statute at issue in the instant case, however, seems to be to arm 
police with a means, which would not otherwise be available, to gather 
information.  The purpose is not to promote the safety of the officer, as in 
Terry.233  Giving a name, where one was previously unknown, will not provide 
probable cause for an arrest, unless the name itself is incriminating or unless it 
leads to other evidence that is incriminating.  This seemingly is what the Fifth 
Amendment was intended to guard against. 
Another question that the majority left unanswered was what constitutes a 
refusal to identify oneself.  Must a person use words that are unequivocal, such 
as “I refuse” or “I will not,” or can the refusal simply be a matter of hesitancy 
or equivocation?  If a subject responds to an identification request by asking 
questions, can that be interpreted by law enforcement officers as a refusal to 
identify?  Suppose an individual, after refusing to give his name and after 
being arrested, changes his mind and voluntarily reveals his identity.  Is the 
individual still subject to arrest?  Is he still subject to being confined in jail?  Is 
he still subject to prosecution?  Normal principles of criminal law would 
dictate the answer to all of these questions should be in the affirmative.  
Surely, no one would advance the argument that one who voluntarily returns 
stolen property after his arrest should be released or should be able to escape 
prosecution. 
Unlike in the instant case, the exercise of the new Hiibel police power will 
not always involve a videotape of the events, nor will it involve individuals 
captured on that videotape refusing unequivocally, on multiple occasions, to 
 
 230. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 187-88 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)). 
 231. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (“[T]his type of case leads us to . . . permit a 
reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer.”) 
 232. Id.  An officer may not subject a Terry detainee to a frisk unless the officer suspects that 
the suspect is armed or fears for his safety.  Id. 
 233. See Klein, supra note 223, at 366 (noting that “[t]he exigencies that justify a weapons 
search simply do not arise in the case of compelled identification”). 
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identify themselves.  Rather, it logically follows that the most frequent use of 
this new law enforcement tool will involve situations where no videotape is 
made or available.  Is it reasonable to believe that an arrest will take place if, 
and only if, there are multiple unequivocal refusals by an individual to identify 
himself? 
The Court’s holding has far-reaching consequences for law-abiding 
citizens.  Once an officer has procured the requisite probable cause for arrest, 
the protections of the Fifth Amendment are implicated.234  Additionally, 
Miranda v. Arizona mandates that police are required to apprise suspects of 
their rights once they are placed under arrest.235The holding in Hiibel creates a 
regime where law enforcement officers may compel speech from citizens who 
are not under arrest.236  It seems illogical for a court to now hold that a police 
officer is required to advise a suspect of his right to remain silent only after 
that officer has first compelled that suspect to make what is an incriminating 
statement.  In this sense, the Court’s holding rewards the officer who is 
subjectively suspicious, but who has no probable cause to arrest, or even to 
detain an individual further. 
Lastly, the Hiibel decision continues the emerging trend of Justice 
Clarence Thomas as a man whose words and actions diverge in a way that 
defies logic and explanation.  While he has always opposed the traditional 
concepts of affirmative action plans, (see for example his confirmation hearing 
testimony under the watchful eye of Senator Arlen Specter)237 he has 
consistently and steadfastly expressed his opposition to, and humbling 
experiences with, discrimination, bigotry, and inequality.238  While the 
opposition of Justice Thomas to affirmative action programs may be arguably 
justified by his stated belief that minorities should be given a hand up rather 
than a hand down, no such justification can be given for his continuing 
propensity to join with the conservative wing of the Court in limiting or 
 
 234. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460-63 (1966). 
 235. Id. at 467-68. 
 236. See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177, 191 (2004) (Stevens. 
J., dissenting). 
 237. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 373 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The 
majority of blacks are admitted to the Law School because of discrimination, and because of this 
policy all are tarred as undeserving.”). 
 238. Justice Thomas wrote the following in 1986: “I’m a black southerner. I grew up under 
the heel of segregation.  And I have always found it offensive for the government to treat people 
differently from others because of the color of their skin.”  Hearing of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee on the Nomination of Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court, available at 
http://tinyurl.com/98bhe [hereinafter Nomination of Clarence Thomas].  When reflecting on his 
youth, Justice Thomas said in a speech to students at Savannah College, “Not a day passed that I 
was not pricked by that ever-present trident of prejudice.”  Nancy Langston, Clarence Thomas: A 
Method in His Message?, available at http://college.holycross.edu/studentorgs/hcprelaw/ 
clarence.html. 
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denying individual liberties.  It is particularly troubling when this propensity 
ends in decisions that will result in the disproportionate enforcement against 
minorities. 
By its decision in Hiibel, the majority has given a free and unfettered rein 
to law enforcement officers to arrest individuals who refuse to reveal their 
names under what can only be described as less than definitive circumstances.  
What facts, as per the subject statute, give rise to a reasonable belief that one 
“is about to commit a crime?”  Is it reasonable for an officer to believe that a 
African American man found on the streets of an all white neighborhood at 
1:00 a.m. is about to commit a crime?  Is there any doubt but that the newly 
created Hiibel power will be disproportionably utilized against African 
Americans and other minorities?  Contrary to what Justice Thomas may 
believe, this new power will not be predominantly utilized against white men 
in the rural areas of a western state, as was the case in Hiibel.  Rather, logic 
and intuition dictate that “stop and identify” statutes will be subject to 
discriminatory enforcement in inner city areas. 
Did Justice Thomas really become a lawyer to change the illegitimate and 
dishonest practices he saw while growing up in the South?  Did he really 
become a lawyer to make sure that minorities were not denied access to 
society?239  Does he really believe that there should be aggressive enforcement 
of civil rights so as to protect individual rights?240  If so, it is suggested that 
Mr. Justice Thomas consider implementing these principles in the decision-
making process he utilizes as a member of this country’s highest Court.  Mr. 
Justice Thomas brings with him to the Supreme Court a perspective and 
background, which are unlike those of any other member of the Court.  His 
perspective and background are such that one would logically believe he would 
do all he could to eliminate those societal practices and circumstances which 
foster discrimination and which sanction a disproportional loss of individual 
rights.  It is unfortunate that Justice Thomas declined to take advantage of the 
opportunity presented in Hiibel to address these issues. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Court’s holding in Hiibel represents an important development in the 
history of constitutional law.  Sadly, the Court has decided against protecting 
individual liberty by expanding the exception to the probable cause 
 
 239. At his confirmation hearing for the position he held prior to his appointment to the 
Supreme Court, Justice Thomas testified, “The reason I became a lawyer was to make sure that 
minorities, individuals who did not have access to this society, gained access.” Nomination of 
Clarence Thomas, supra note 238. 
 240. At his confirmation hearing, Justice Thomas stated he believed that “equality is the basis 
for aggressive enforcement of civil rights laws and equal opportunity laws designed to protect 
individual rights.” Id. 
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requirement found in Terry and by upholding a law with problematic 
applications.  Without question, a line of cases will arise where our courts will 
have to decide whether they will sanction the expansion of the investigative 
authority of our police at the further expense of individual liberties, or whether 
established Constitutional principles should prevail.  Eventually, some court 
will have to decide a case where a suspect was faced with the choice of self 
incrimination or the imposition of criminal penalties under a “stop and 
identify” statute.  Hopefully, the Supreme Court will heed the warning issued 
by one of our nation’s founding fathers over two hundred years ago: “Those 
who would give up essential liberty, to purchase a little temporary safety, 
deserve neither liberty nor safety.”241 
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